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Abstract:  Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and
dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor
relationship.  We find a consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee
actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases.  This discrepancy is evident through
stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions.  We present evidence and discuss
implications.2
Though employment conditions have been increasing over time, recent trends in the
labor market point to increased employee dissatisfaction and hostility, manifested through
the rising number of employment lawsuits, employee turnover, employee complaints, and
even workplace violence.  In a 1998 survey (Flynn, 1998), 84% of surveyed HR
professionals reported increased employee hostility in their organizations; 67% of them
blamed this increased hostility on employees' having excessively high expectations. A
seminal work in investigating satisfaction is Hamermesh (1977).  Recently, Hamermesh
(1998) showed, using labor data, that satisfaction is very much dependent on expectations
and that satisfaction is greatly affected when reality does not meet expectations.
The employment relationship is generally considered to be an incomplete contract.
1
Both parties to this contract have unspecified obligations and considerable discretion in their
actions.  Blau (1964) contends that this effectively makes the relationship one of social
exchange.  Studies such as Akerlof (1982), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), Akerlof
and Yellen (1990) and Charness (1996) demonstrate that perception of fair (or unfair)
treatment is an important influence on choices made in this environment.  Given the
subjective nature of this issue, management must consider the employee point of view when
making evaluations and policy.
One’s view of fair treatment depends on one’s own internal reference point.  This
reference point is likely to be colored by what is known as the self-serving bias.  This is the
tendency for self-interested parties to evaluate reality in self-serving ways.
2  Of greater
importance to the setting of this article is that judgement about fairness is skewed in the
                                                       
1 For example, see Milgrom and Roberts (1992), pg. 329
2 Svensson (1981) finds that 93% of American drivers believe that they are above-average drivers.3
direction of self-interest (Messick and Sentis, 1979).
3  If agents indeed value fairness in the
outcome, then self-serving biases could play a decisive role in the determination of
outcomes.  Babcock et al. (1995) and Babcock and Lowenstein (1997) demonstrate the
importance of the self-serving bias in dispute resolution and union bargaining.
The self-serving bias could result in individuals processing relevant as well as
irrelevant information to arrive at the “fair allocation” in self-serving ways.  Such self-
serving notions of fairness can be manipulated by altering economically irrelevant procedural
details.  For example, ultimatum game proposals and responses are affected by the process
by which the proposer is selected  (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982 and 1985; Hoffman et al.,
1994); the arbitrary assignment of roles (plaintiff or defendant) strongly affects fairness
perceptions in Babcock et al. (1995).
  In this article, we present evidence of a self-serving bias in a simulated labor market
experiment.  Each subject was assigned the role of either an employer or an employee and
each employee was assigned a wage and responded with an effort choice between 0.1 and
1.0, inclusive.  The employee's payoff was decreasing in effort and therefore his own payoff-
maximizing effort was 0.1, while the matched employer's payoff increased with higher effort.
We examine results when the employer did not choose the wage, but was simply told the
assigned wage and asked to state what effort he would provide in the employee role.  Next
the employee’s actual effort choice was revealed and the employer was asked to state his
level of satisfaction with this choice, on a scale of 1 to 7.  More detail on the experimental
design is presented in Appendix A.
                                                       
3 Explanations include the tendency overestimate one's own contribution to joint tasks (Ross and Sicoly,4
Evidence Subjects in the employer role generally state they would provide, at any given
wage, more effort than subjects in the employee role actually provide.  Let e
h denote the
hypothetical effort stated by the employer and e
a denote the actual effort exercised by the





















h exceeded minimum effort by 23% more than did e
a, so that actual
employer profits (and employee productivity) were substantially lower than they would have
been with employer-indicated effort choices.  It seems probable that this effect would be
even greater with employer-generated wages.
We can test for the significance of the observed differences.  A basic test that is easy
to implement is the binomial test (Siegel, 1956):
Z = [(x- NP) –1/2] / [ ) 1 ( P NP - ,
where x is the number of observations in the category in question, N is the total number of
observations, and P is the probability (under the null hypothesis) of getting an observation in
this category.  This test gives significance at a p-value of .00001.  Alternatively, we can





a.  We calculate the t-statistic to be 3.506, with a p-value of less than
0.0005.  Hence, we reject that e
h = e
a against the alternative that e
h > e
a.
We test whether the employer’s level of expressed satisfaction with the employee
effort level is affected by the difference between the hypothetical monetary gain to the
                                                                                                                                                                        
1979) and also to attribute successes to ability but failures to bad luck (Zuckerman, 1979).5
employer and the actual monetary gain to the employer.  Otherwise, the stated hypothetical
effort would not be expected to affect the employer's expectation from the employee.  An
ordered probit regression of employer's satisfaction against monetary payoffs yields a log-
likelihood of  -532.837.  Including the difference between hypothetical and actual payoff in
the regression increases the log-likelihood to -467.547.  Given the nested nature of the pure
monetary model within the model with both monetary payoffs and the difference term, we
can easily reject the view that the employer's stated hypothetical effort is not a genuine
reflection of employer expectation.  See Tables 1 and 2 for parameter estimates for the
ordered probit regressions.
Discussion We have shown a real and consistent one-sided bias between hypothesized
efforts and actual efforts, but have yet to demonstrate the self-serving nature of this bias.
One way to see the self-serving nature of the bias is to look at the difference in implied
shares.  While both employers and employees declare, on average, an effort level in which
the employee's share is greater, the employer's stated effort implies a more equal division.
That difference is significant (see figure 1).  The self-serving nature of the bias is also
observable in the asymmetry in employer satisfaction with respect to whether e
h > e
a or vice
versa.  We find a rather consistent bias - a positive difference in effort levels must be 50%
greater than the corresponding negative difference to induce the same change in employer
satisfaction (see Figure 2 and Table 2).
The self-serving bias has important consequences for labor relations and
productivity.  Perceptions of fairness are critical in an employment context, since the labor
contract is notably imprecise and behavior is substantially discretionary.  This bias could lead6
employers and managers to make poor predictions of employee perceptions of fairness and
their consequent responses.  An inappropriate wage would have direct adverse effects on
productivity, manifested in shirking, strikes, and even sabotage.
We feel that it is useful for managers and employers to be cognizant of the self-
serving bias.  Aligning perceptions and expectations of fairness seems crucial in interactive
environments such as the workplace, as the consequences for productivity and labor
relations may be large.7
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Figure 1 The employee's share under the employee's actual effort function (of wage) and

















Figure 2 Ordered Probit Results
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Di = Actual effort by employee - Hypothetical employee effort by employer
Score = A subjective measure of happiness by employer on a scale of 1-7.
Di < A0 Score = 1
A0 < Di < A1 Score = 2
A1 < Di < A2 Score = 3
A2 < Di < A3 Score = 4
A3 < Di < A4 Score = 5
A4 < Di < A5 Score = 6
A5 < Di Score >= 7
Table 1: Satisfaction on monetary payoff
Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. t-statistic
A0 6.821 0.970 7.033
A1 11.627 0.881 13.197
A2 16.248 0.750 21.658
A3 27.252 0.798 34.157
A4 33.891 1.066 31.781
A5 39.349 1.253 31.403
s 9.7061 0.383 25.312
Log Likelihood = -532.837
Table 2: Satisfaction on monetary payoffs and difference between hypothetical and actual monetary
payoff
Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. t-statistic
a -0.55092 0.044038 -12.5101
A0 -4.5902 1.16776 -3.93078
A1 -0.04036 1.2075 -0.03342
A2 4.55945 1.13178 4.02858
A3 15.4403 0.998559 15.4626
A4 22.0714 1.08801 20.2861
A5 27.3381 1.12889 24.2167
s 7.69769 0.259208 29.697
Log Likelihood = - 467.54711
Appendix A: The Experiment
  Subjects were divided into “employers” and employees” and separated into two
rooms.  An employee received a wage between 20 and 90 and was asked to specify an effort
level between .1 and 1.0.  There were 10 periods in each session and participants were
anonymously re-matched in each period.  The monetary payoff functions were common
knowledge and were given by:
￿F = (120 – w)￿e, (1)
and
￿E = w – c(e) – 20 (2)
where F represents the employer (firm), E the employee, e denotes the employee’s effort, w
is the wage, and c(e) is the cost of effort, a function increasing in e. The cost function facing
an employee is as follows:
Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
The wage was determined by either a third party or by a draw from a bingo cage.
Each employer was individually told the wage received by the paired employee and, before
being told the employee’s choice of effort, was asked to state what effort he or she would
have provided at the indicated wage. Next, the employee’s effort choice was revealed and
the employer was asked to express an opinion about this choice on a scale from 1-7.